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The (not-so) “Brave New World of
International Criminal Enforcement” :
1

THE INTRICACIES OF MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL
WHITE-COLLAR INVESTIGATIONS
“We are dealing with a new era of crime on a global scale”2
INTRODUCTION
The United States is routinely involved in cross-border
criminal investigations. The Department of Justice (DOJ)
supports the enforcement of federal criminal laws domestically,
and where authorized and appropriate, abroad.3 Notably, within
the DOJ’s Criminal Division, the Fraud Section has proven
instrumental in combatting economic crime around the world.4
It has the capabilities of “managing complex and multi-district
litigation” and has the “ability to [position] resources . . . to
address law enforcement priorities and respond to
geographically shifting crim[inal]” investigations.5 In the
aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, however, the DOJ has
come under the scrutiny of commentators and practitioners in
the financial and legal fields for the apparent decline in federal
white-collar prosecutions.6 In fact, there has been an ongoing
decline in both these prosecutions and their convictions,
reaching a twenty-year historic low in 2015.7 This raises the
question: how can there be a decline when prominent financial
firms and their top executives were at the forefront of the
United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 (2d Cir. 2017).
Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks
at the 26th Annual Association of Certified Fraud Examiners Global Fraud Conference
(June 15, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-rcaldwell-delivers-remarks-26th-annual-association [https://perma.cc/PC37-E7P9].
3 See U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD SECTION (FRD), https://www.justice.gov/
criminal-fraud [https://perma.cc/WY42-KDEB].
4 See id.
5 Id.
6 See James Kwak, America’s Top Prosecutors Used to Go After Top Executives. What
Changed?, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/books/review/thechickenshit-club-jesse-eisinger-.html [https://perma.cc/BXZ9-SYWZ].
7 White Collar Crime Convictions Continue to Decline, TRACREPORTS (Apr. 7,
2016), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/421/ [https://perma.cc/D29N-SYZX].
1
2
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financial crisis which “devastated the global economy and cost
the United States almost nine million jobs?”8
Commentators have explained that the DOJ’s failure to
prosecute corporations and their employees stems from the evergrowing social hierarchy within the DOJ itself.9 The cultural
shift at the DOJ since the early 2000s has brought in the top
prosecutors from the most powerful law firms in the country.10
Increasingly, DOJ prosecutors and defense attorneys come from
the same collection of sophisticated and well-educated litigators,
though at different stages in their careers.11 The mindset,
therefore, is that conducting a criminal investigation against
heads of multimillion dollar global corporations is not only risky
but “social[ly] uncomfortable” and career compromising.12 Even
with a seemingly flawless case, “going to trial is always
[considered] a gamble.”13 Not only are there career ramifications
of having “a ding on [a prosecutor’s] record,” but “[l]os[ing] a
white-collar criminal trial” is seen as “prosecutorial overreach.”14
James Comey, a former United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York (SDNY), used the term the “Chickenshit
Club”15 to describe the members of the DOJ’s social structure.
This club, he explained, is comprised of prosecutors who have
never had an acquittal or hung jury because they do not want to
jeopardize their pristine record, future career opportunities, and
the “symbiotic relationship . . . between Big Law and the
Department of Justice.”16
Similar to the social aspects driving the DOJ’s
prosecutorial approach, professionals in the legal field have
called into question its use of deferred prosecution agreements
8 Kwak, supra note 6 (emphasis added); Justice Department Data Reveal 29
Percent Drop in Criminal Prosecutions of Corporations, TRACREPORTS (Apr. 7, 2016),
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406/ [https://perma.cc/X4Z3-LRU7] (corporate
prosecutions filed from 2004 to 2014 has decreased by over twenty-nine percent).
9 JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES xi-xxi (2017).
10 See generally id.
11 See id. at 177–78.
12 Kwak, supra note 6.
13 Patrick Radden Keefe, Why Corrupt Bankers Avoid Jail, NEW YORKER (July
31, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/07/31/why-corrupt-bankers-avoidjail [https://perma.cc/JVX2-WD2C].
14 Id.
15 EISINGER, supra note 9 at xii; see also CNN Library, James Comey Fast
Facts, CNN (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/03/us/james-comey-fastfacts/index.html [https://perma.cc/JQE8-GKKY].
16 Kwak, supra note 6; EISINGER, supra note 9, at 192; see also EISINGER, supra
note 9 at 194 (“It became no longer clear whether the Department of Justice pushed
investigations that turned out to be lucrative for the white-shoe big law firms or whether
big law firms nudged prosecutors into conducting the types of investigation that required
lucrative internal probes.”).

2018]

(NOT SO) BRAVE NEW WORLD

301

(DPA) and non-prosecution agreements (NPA)—a relatively
new, “civilized” technique for charging corporations.17 These
agreements, the first of which was formed by Mary Jo White of
the U.S. Attorney’s office for the SDNY in 1994,18 require
admissions of corporate wrongdoing as a whole but “avoid the
ignominy of criminal [white-collar] convictions,” so long as a
corporation fulfills its commitments under the agreement.19 The
DOJ’s Criminal Division has entered into these agreements “in
more than two-thirds of the corporate cases it resolved between
2010 and 2012.”20 Judge Jed Rakoff, a senior United States
District Judge of the SDNY, at a New York City Bar Association
presentation declared that not indicting individuals, but instead
using DPAs to settle corporate cases, was “technically and
morally suspect.”21 In 2013, he further noted that the “DOJ ha[d]
‘not prosecuted any top Wall Street executive in relation to the
financial crisis but [instead,] struck deals with companies using
deferred prosecution agreement[s] over sanction violations and
money laundering without charging any individuals.’”22 What
incentives, then, do corporations have to not engage in
fraudulent transactions, or hold their employees accountable for
engaging in financially motivated crimes, if the DOJ is
essentially giving out a free pass?23
17 Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, The ‘Civil-izing’ of White-Collar
Criminal
Enforcement,
N.Y.
L.J.
(May
27,
2013,
12:00
AM),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202598915323/The-Civilizing-of-WhiteCollarCriminal-Enforcement [https://perma.cc/LG95-MV7Q].
18 See EISINGER, supra note 9, at 93.
19 David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate
Criminal Prosecution, 49 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2016) (“In a deferred
prosecution agreement, criminal charges are filed but eventually dismissed if the
corporation complies with the terms of the agreement; in a non-prosecution agreement,
criminal charges are never even filed if the company meets its obligations under the
agreement.”) Id. at 1237 n.1; see also Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 17.
20 Uhlmann supra note 19 at 1237; see also EISINGER, supra note 9, at 197
(“Through the 2000s—with the Enron reversals, the Arthur Andersen backlash, the
Thompson memo rollback, the KPMG case, the Bear Stearns trial losses—prosecutors
began to focus less on investigations of individual executives. All the changes moved in
one direction: to help big corporations and their top officials.”).
21 Thomas Fox, Are Deferred Prosecution Agreements Morally Suspect?,
LEXISNEXIS
LEGAL
NEWSROOM
CORP.
(Nov.
20,
2013,
12:36
PM)
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/corporate/b/fcpa-compliance/archive/2013/
11/20/are-deferred-prosecution-agreements-morally-suspect.aspx?Redirected=true
[https://perma.cc/Z5MK-YPE4]; see also Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, U.S. DISTRICT CT. SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF N.Y., http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Rakoff [https://perma.cc/78YQEQDZ]. Judge Rakoff delivered the district court opinion in United States v. Allen, 160
F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) rev’d, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017).
22 Fox, supra note 21.
23 As early as the 1980s, the practical effects of white-collar prosecutions, or
lack thereof, on corporate actors have played an important role in policy debates. John
Keeney, the former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ’s Criminal Division
responded to a bill to amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1986 as follows:
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While the DOJ’s cultural landscape and its monetary
compliance agreements arguably offer troubling insight into the
Department’s growing leniency towards prosecuting financial
corporations and their employees, a more fundamental concern
has come into focus from a recent United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit decision, United States v. Allen.24 On July
19, 2017, the court reversed the DOJ’s first successful
prosecution of two individuals in connection with the London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) manipulation scandal of 2012.25
In Allen, the court unanimously overturned a fraud conviction of
two defendants, finding that the prosecution was tainted by the
DOJ’s reliance on a witness who had been exposed to the
defendants’ compelled testimony before a parallel government
agency in the United Kingdom.26 The court held that the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the use and derivative use of compelled
testimony in criminal proceedings in American courtrooms even
if that testimony was legally obtained abroad.27 Despite
recognizing a growing interdependency on foreign agencies to
aid in global financial investigations, the appeals court used the
heavy Kastigar burden28 to find the evidence presented at trial
was tainted and to reverse the indictments.29 Not only did the
Second Circuit interpret the guiding legal precedent to extend to
foreign-obtained evidence, it also confirmed that the burden of
establishing an airtight fraud investigation from its inception
fell on the DOJ30—offering little to no guidance on how to
accomplish this feat.
If the risk of conduct in violation of the statute becomes merely monetary, the
fine will simply become a cost of doing business, payable only upon being
caught and in many instances, it will be only a fraction of the profit acquired
from the corrupt activity. Absent the threat of incarceration, there may no
longer be any compelling need to resist the urge to acquire business in any way
possible.
Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution
Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C DAVIS L. REV. 497,
529–30 n.97 (2015) (quoting Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act,
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. And Monetary Policy and the Subcomm.
on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 149 (1986)
(response to written questions of Senator D’Amato from John C. Keeney)).
24 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 101 (2d Cir. 2017).
25 See id.; see also Sean Hecker & Karolos Seeger, The Use of Foreign Compelled
Testimony in Cross-Border Investigations—The Impact of the Second Circuit’s Allen
Decision, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: BUSINESS CRIME 2018,
9–12 (2018), http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/pdf/bc18_chapter%203%20%20
debevoise%20and%20plimpton.pdf [https://perma.cc/58F9-UFFX].
26 Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25, at 9.
27 Allen, 864 F.3d at 101; Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25, at 9.
28 See infra Section I.A.
29 Allen, 864 F.3d at 87–88, 97; Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25.
30 See Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25, at 13.
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Although this note does not seek to argue that the DOJ
should forgo upholding the values of the Constitution, notably
the Self-Incrimination Clause under the Fifth Amendment, or
that the Second Circuit erred in overturning the indictments in
the Allen case, it does question an almost out-of-date approach
to conducting international white-collar criminal investigations.
Such a restriction to use testimony, either directly or indirectly,
compelled lawfully in foreign jurisdictions creates an enormous
hurdle for the DOJ to overcome.31 The impact of the Allen case
deters and provides little incentive for the DOJ to pursue
international crime on a global scale, especially related to
market manipulation, which was a factor in the financial crisis.32
In an age of global markets and cross-border financial crime, the
DOJ’s failure to prosecute these crimes can be attributed to the
challenges and complexity faced by prosecutors in investigating
and prosecuting multinational corporations, which could very
well be amplified by the Allen decision. This note argues that the
ever-expanding, multi-jurisdictional aspect of prosecutions has
created a need to establish a new overarching agreement, such as
a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and taint team hybrid, between
the United States and foreign jurisdictions who currently use
legally obtained compelled testimony—an international approach
to combat an international problem.
Part I of this note explores the background of the use and
derivative use immunity statute and the Supreme Court’s
Kastigar standard that influenced the Second Circuit’s decision in
Allen, highlighting the decision’s potential impact. Part II
analyzes the breadth of international white-collar crimes and
calls into question the Second Circuit’s “solutions” for the DOJ
moving forward. Part III proposes an international legal solution
for prosecuting global financial crimes by implementing bilateral
treaties between the DOJ and its foreign counterparts. This
would essentially shift the overwhelming burden of obtaining
taint-free testimony to all prosecutorial agencies involved,
eliminating the constitutional question altogether.
I.

THE ALLEN DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

A.

Derivative Use Immunity and the Kastigar Standard

The Allen decision has significant implications if
subsequent cases rely on its holding, and understanding the
31
32

Id.
Id.
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guiding legal precedent behind the decision provides insight on
the constitutional concerns arising out of foreign-obtained
evidence. In 1972, the Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United
States adopted the use immunity statute as the constitutional
standard for gathering testimony.33 Specifically, it “upheld the
constitutionality of compelling testimony in exchange for the
‘use and derivative use’ immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002.”34 It
reasoned that “the scope of the protection [the immunity statute]
afforded was ‘coextensive with the scope of the [Fifth
Amendment35] privilege.’”36 The Court stressed that the “use and
derivative use” that is implicit in the language of the immunity
statute protects defendants and witnesses from the direct “use”
of protected statements in trial and the “derivative use” of any
immunized testimony and evidence gained as a result of those
protected statements.37 Therefore, the statute prohibits the use
of “compelled testimony in any respect” to ensure that the
testimony does not implicate the witness or violate the immunity
provided under the Amendment.38 The Court reaffirmed that the
burden of proof was on the United States government to prove
that its evidence used at trial is not based on immunized
testimony or the fruits of such testimony.39 This, however,
cannot be established by a mere “negation of taint[ed]”
evidence.40 Rather, the prosecution has “the affirmative duty to

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460–62 (1972).
United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 91 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Kastigar, 406
U.S. at 453).
35 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in
pertinent part provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.” Id.
36 Allen, 864 F.3d at 91 (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453).
37 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443, 459–60.
33
34

The use immunity statute (18 U.S.C. § 6002) allows the government to
prosecute the witness using evidence obtained independently of the witness’s
immunized testimony. Section 6002 provides: “[N]o testimony or other
information compelled under the order (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.”
OFF. OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRM 500-999, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL
718. DERIVATIVE USE IMMUNITY, https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual718-derivative-use-immunity [https://perma.cc/A78A-K68F] [hereinafter CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL].
38 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original); see also CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 37.
39 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460; see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y.
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964).
40 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
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prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.”41
This holding has led courts in subsequent white-collar
cases, including multinational financial cases like Allen, to
require a “Kastigar hearing” in which the prosecution must
prove that its case is solely attributable to taint-free evidence.42
A Kastigar hearing, conducted following initial briefings and
oral arguments regarding a defendant’s Kastigar motion,43 is
used to “definitively resolve” the issues of whether the
prosecution has met its burden.44 This hearing is similar but not
synonymous to an evidentiary hearing.45 Its scope is limited to
assessing the “illicit ‘use’ of compelled testimony” in the
American courtroom.46 More formulaically, the court overhearing
the case must analyze whether the prosecution has violated a
defendant’s or witnesses’ Fifth Amendment rights if one of the
following is met: (1) the “immunized testimony has some
evidentiary effect in a prosecution against the witness”; (2) “there
is a recognizable danger of official manipulation that may subject
the immunized witness to a criminal prosecution arising out of
the investigation in which the testimony is given”; or (3) a
“cooperating witness’s exposure to compelled testimony motivates
that witness to cooperate and testify against the defendants.”47
B.

The Second Circuit’s Decision in Allen

The Allen case arose out of a United Kingdom
investigation of two employees, Anthony Allen and Anthony
Id.; see also CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 37.
See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461–62. The Second Circuit interpreted the
Kastigar burden of proof as a preponderance of the evidence standard four years after
the Kastigar decision, emphasizing that
41
42

[w]hile this formulation repeats rather than defines the word “derived,” it
places a significant gloss upon it by putting the burden firmly on the
prosecution to demonstrate that an indictment [and/or conviction] is the
product of legitimate rather than tainted evidence, and by insisting that
legitimate evidence be from a source “wholly independent of the compelled
testimony.”
United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1976) (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 92 (2d Cir. 2017).
43 United States v. Volpe, 42 F. Supp. 2d 204, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (“While the
court has discretion to hold the [Kastigar] hearing before, during, or after the trial, it is
the general practice in this circuit to defer such a hearing until after trial.”) (citations
omitted); see also United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y, 2016) rev’d, 864
F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017).
44 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 687.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 690.
47 Id. at 691 (citing United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 82 (2d Cir.1991));
see also United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 689–90 (2d Cir.1990).

306

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1

Conti, at Rabobank, a Netherlands-based bank, for their roles as
the bank’s U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitters in the suspected
manipulation of the rate.48 In 2013, the United Kingdom’s
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), an equivalent agency to the
DOJ, carried out compulsory interviews,49 pursuant to its
statutory authority, where both Allen and Conti were compelled
to testify, potentially under penalty of imprisonment.50 Adhering
to U.K. law, the FCA granted the defendants direct use
immunity but not derivative use immunity, a distinction allowed
abroad but not domestically.51 The FCA also conducted an
interview with Rabobank’s Japanese Yen LIBOR submitter,
Paul Robson, for his suspected involvement in the manipulation

48 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2017). Manipulating
benchmark interest rates, notably LIBOR, has grave consequences. “LIBOR [itself] is a
benchmark interest rate based on the rates at which banks lend unsecured funds to each
other on the London interbank market.” James McBride, Understanding the Libor
Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/
understanding-libor-scandal [https://perma.cc/NKB6-USAH]. Worldwide, financial
institutions use LIBOR as a base rate for setting interest rates on “hundreds of trillions
of dollars in securities and [consumer and corporate] loans . . . . including government
and corporate debt, as well as auto, student, and home loans, including over half of the
United States’ flexible rate mortgages.” Id.; see also Allen, 864 F.3d at 69.
49 Interviews under compulsion may be conducted by the FCA under sections 171 to
173 of Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000. The relevant sections of the Act are as follows:

171. Powers of persons appointed under section 167.
(1) An investigator may require the person who is the subject of the
investigation (“the person under investigation”) or any person connected with
the person under investigation—
(a) to attend before the investigator at a specified time and place and
answer questions; or
(b) otherwise to provide such information as the investigator may require.
(2) An investigator may also require any person to produce at a specified time
and place any specified documents or documents of a specified description.
(3) A requirement under subsection (1) or (2) may be imposed only so far as the
investigator concerned reasonably considers the question, provision of
information or production of the document to be relevant to the purposes of the
investigation.
Financial Services and Market Act 2000, c.8 § 171 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2000/8/section/171 [https://perma.cc/8499-E9WT].
50 United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), rev’d, 864
F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017).
51 See Section I.A (discussing United States’ treatment of “use and derivative
use” immunity); see also Clients & Friends Memorandum from Cadwalader, Wickersham
& Taft, LLP, US Second Circuit Finds Testimony Compelled by UK Regulators to be
Inadmissible in Criminal Proceedings (July 26, 2017), https://www.cadwalader.com/
resources/clients-friends-memos/us-second-circuit-finds-testimony-compelled-by-ukregulators-to-be-inadmissible-in-criminal-proceedings [https://perma.cc/ZU5K-XZZ8]
(describing the common law and statutory protection granted to defendants and
witnesses under U.K. law).
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scheme.52 Later that same year, the FCA pursued a regulatory
enforcement action against Robson and disclosed to him relevant
testimonial evidence which included Allen and Conti’s compelled
statements.53 Shortly after, however, the FCA stayed its action
against Robson and gave all of its evidence overseas to the DOJ
which had already begun pursuing its own criminal
investigation.54 In 2014, the DOJ charged Robson with bank fraud
to which he plead guilty.55 As part of Robson’s plea package, he
agreed to be a witness in the mounting case by both the U.K. and
U.S. enforcement agencies against Allen and Conti.56
Aware of potential Fifth Amendment and tainted
evidence issues, the DOJ advised Robson that he was not to
provide any of the information he gleaned from Allen’s and
Conti’s transcripts with U. S. prosecutors, since his testimony
before the grand jury was to be solely based on his personal
knowledge.57 The DOJ coordinated with the FCA and held
meetings to address the need to establish a wall between the two
agencies.58 It even used a “separate filter team” of attorneys from
a different section of the DOJ to address issues related to the
FCA’s compulsory interviews.59 Following Robson’s testimony
before the United States court, both Allen and Conti were
charged with bank and wire fraud.60 Allen and Conti’s
indictments rested solely on “certain material information
[Robson] supplied to the grand jury.”61
On appeal, Allen and Conti argued that the DOJ had
violated their Fifth Amendment rights through the derivative
use of their compelled testimony heard during trial when Robson
was called upon to testify.62 Arguing the standards for testimony
gathering addressed in Kastigar,63 they contended that the
District Court erred in assessing whether Robson’s testimony
was tainted by his exposure to Allen and Conti’s FCA-compelled
testimony, that the DOJ did not meet its burden of showing that
all testimony used during trial was untainted, and that the
Allen, 864 F.3d at 68, 72, 76.
Id. at 76–77.
54 Id. at 77.
55 Id. at 68, 77.
56 Id. at 68.
57 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 694–95.
58 Id.
59 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on
Kastigar at 2 n.1, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:14-cr00272-JSR), ECF No. 95.
60 Allen, 864 F.3d at 68.
61 Id.; see also Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25, at 9.
62 Allen, 864 F.3d at 68, 79.
63 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460–62 (1972).
52
53
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DOJ’s use of Robson’s testimony was “not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.”64 The defendants filed a motion for a post-trial
Kastigar hearing or to suppress Robson’s testimony.65 The motion
argued that because Robson’s review of the FCA transcripts
violated the defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights and ultimately
tainted Robson’s testimony in the United States proceedings, the
indictments against Allen and Conti should be overturned.66
The Second Circuit confirmed that applying a Kastigar
analysis to the evidence of the case exposed the DOJ’s
manipulation of foreign-compelled testimony and denied the
defendants a fair trial domestically.67 It concluded that “the Fifth
Amendment’s prohibition on the [derivative] use of [a defendant’s]
compelled testimony in American criminal proceedings applies
even when a foreign sovereign has compelled [that] testimony.”68
Under American constitutional law, it reasoned that because the
Kastigar decision correctly safeguarded a defendant’s right to a fair
trial, compelled testimony must be granted use and derivative use
immunity—any amount or form of taint is prohibited.69 While the
Second Circuit did not go so far as the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States v. North70 to
require the DOJ to demonstrate that a witness’s exposure to
compelled testimony “did not in any manner subtly ‘refresh his
memory, focus or organize his thoughts,’ or in some other traceless
way influence his state of mind,” it did hold that the DOJ is
required to prove that a defendant’s exposure “did not shape, alter,
or affect the information that he provided and that the Government
used.”71 This burden, while not as overwhelming as the one
announced in North, creates a towering obstacle for the DOJ to
confront in an already complex investigation.72
Despite the Second Circuit’s firm decision to expand the
use of the Kastigar standard to evaluate foreign-compelled
64 Allen, 864 F.3d at 79 (emphasis in original); see also Hecker & Seeger, supra
note 25 at 10.
65 Allen, 864 F.3d 63 at 78.
66 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 691–92.
67 Allen, 864 F.3d at 97.
68 Id. at 68; see also Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25 at 10.
69 Allen, 864 F.3d at-68; see also CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL supra note 37.
70 See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
71 Allen, 864 F.3d at 93 (internal quotations omitted); see also Marc P. Berger
& Yana Grishkan, Second Circuit Rules Fifth Amendment Applicable to Statements
Provided to Foreign Governments, BLOOMBERG L. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (July 31, 2017),
http://www.ropeswealthadvisors.com/~/media/Files/articles/2017/July/spRabobank%20
73117%20SRLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XHU-QSEF].
72 See Peter J. Henning, Libor And London Whale Cases Show Hurdles with
Foreign Defendants, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/24/business/dealbook/fraud-prosecution-libor-london-whale-cases.html?mcubz=1
[https://perma.cc/RHY9-VV3V].
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testimony, it did address the DOJ’s concern that prohibition of
foreign-compelled testimony on its use in United States courts
could “hamper the prosecution of criminal conduct that crosses
international borders.”73 It explicitly recognized that cross-border
criminal investigations have become more prevalent in recent
years and that foreign agencies are increasingly reaching out to
the DOJ for cooperation and aid with fraud investigations.74 The
court noted, however, that the DOJ has recently taken steps to
circumvent Kastigar issues by embedding DOJ prosecutors into
foreign law enforcement departments, equivalent to “taint
teams.”75 It commended the agency on taking this major step that
goes beyond mere cross-border collaboration since there is
currently “an increased emphasis in the United States on
individual culpability as a component to, or even in place of,
corporate resolutions.”76 The court concluded that while it “do[es]
73 Allen, 864 F.3d at 87–90 (quoting Brief for the United States at 123, U.S. v.
Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (Nos. 16-898 (L), 16-939 (CON)).
74 Allen 864 F.3d at 89; see also Berger & Grishkan, supra note 71.

Acting Assistant Attorney General Blanco explained that, from the DOJ’s
perspective, “we increasingly find ourselves looking across the globe to collect
evidence and identify witnesses necessary to build cases, requiring greater and
closer collaboration with our foreign counterparts.” In Allen, the Second Circuit
recognized the same trend, noting that cross border prosecutions have become
more common and that “[t]he rise in non-prosecution agreements and deferred
prosecution agreements between the U.S. and foreign entities for misconduct
occurring abroad attests to this new reality.”
Hecker & Seeger, supra note 25, at 11 (quoting Kenneth A. Blanco, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Speaks at the Atlantic Council InterAmerican Dialogue Event on lessons from Brazil: Crisis, Corruption and Global
Cooperation, Washington, D.C. (July 19, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/actingassistant-attorney-general-kenneth-blanco-speaks-atlantic-council-inter-american-1 [https://
perma.cc/PMK5-CM6L] (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
75 See Latham & Watkins, Latham & Watkins Client Alert Commentary Number
2153: DOJ Announces Secondment to UK’s Corruption Prosecutor (June 5, 2017),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/DOJ-announces-secondment-UK-corruptionprosecutor [https://perma.cc/4F3Q-LX4U].
On May 24, 2017, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Trevor
N. McFadden announced that the DOJ will send an anti-corruption prosecutor
to work with the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and
Serious Fraud Office (SFO). The two-year secondment will mark the first time
that the DOJ’s Criminal Division has sent a prosecutor to work full-time with
foreign agencies on regulatory and financial crime matters. . . . In his speech,
McFadden highlighted the recent growth in foreign partners’ requests for legal
assistance. He noted a 147% increase in the number of foreign requests for USbased evidence for foreign bribery and corruption investigations and a 75%
increase in the number of requests from the US government to foreign
counterparts since 2012. The DOJ has expanded its Office of International
Affairs and has set up additional units in response to this growth.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Berger & Grishkan, supra note 71; Allen, 864 F.3d at 89
(discussing embedding prosecutors with foreign law enforcement agencies).
76 Berger & Grishkan, supra note 71.
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not presume to know exactly what this brave new world of
international criminal enforcement will entail,” it is, however,
confident that trials conducted within the United States would
continue to remain fair and constitutionally sound.77
Without a detailed solution to overcome the risk of
compelled testimony and its Fifth Amendment implications
infiltrating foreign-collected evidence, the court suggested that the
DOJ, in addition to taint teams, “will need to be in [even] closer
coordination with its foreign counterparts” and to advise parallel
agencies that the United States will need to be part of white-collar
investigations “at even earlier stages” than initially considered.78
Once collaboration is established at the “onset” of an investigation,
the DOJ will then have to be “even more vigilant in gathering
evidence” to ensure that the witnesses with whom the prosecutors
wish to confer testimony “do not become tainted in any way by
compelled testimony.”79 It further noted that the burden to ensure
taint-free evidence, identical to the burden to prove that taint does
not exist at trial in the Kastigar hearing, is exclusively the DOJ’s
and “the risk of error in coordination [with a foreign authority] falls
on the U.S. Government . . . rather than on the subjects and
targets of cross-border investigations.”80 Where two governments
are not working perfectly in concert and where no international
agreement exists concerning the use and derivative use of
compelled testimony, a Kastigar hearing, therefore, seems like an
inevitable practice for every cross-border investigation.
II.

NAVIGATING THE COMPLEXITIES OF PARALLEL
INVESTIGATIONS IN A POST-ALLEN WORLD

The Allen decision presents an expansion of the burden
the DOJ faces to avoid taint in a new world of interconnected
systems of commerce and growing power of multinational
corporations and its employees—an “unprecedented expansion”
Allen, 864 F.3d 63 at 90.
Id. at 89–90; Berger & Grishkan, supra note 71.
79 Berger & Grishkan, supra note 71. In response to the Allen decision, law
firms across the country released “client alerts” with a common message that “lawyers
representing clients in cross-border criminal investigations should immediately
challenge the domestic use of any statements that were compelled—even lawfully so—
in a foreign jurisdiction.” See, e.g., King & Spalding, Client Alert: A Constitutional Check
on Cross-Border Enforcement Tactics: Takeaways from the Second Circuit’s Decision in
United States v. Allen (July 25, 2017) https://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/005/
137/original/ca072517.pdf?1501010675 [https://perma.cc/U3RP-VEPD]. This further
illustrates the underlying theme that the DOJ’s failure to prosecute white-collar crime,
as a result of this decision, is exacerbated by international prosecutions and the use of
compelled testimony.
80 Berger & Grishkan, supra note 71 (alteration in original); Allen, 864 F.3d at 87–88.
77
78
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according to the DOJ.81 Although the Second Circuit did not
articulate how to “measure taint from foreign-obtained”
testimony, its decision has the ability to widely impact the
“government’s legitimate law enforcement efforts” by thwarting
promising international white-collar prosecutions.82 In the DOJ’s
petition for a rehearing en banc of the Allen case it opines that
[w]hether it is a foreign trader seeking to manipulate an interest rate
that affects millions of Americans, a foreign computer hacker seeking
to infiltrate U.S. government or corporate networks to steal the
personal data of our citizens, or a foreign terrorist seeking to harm our
national security, threats that originate overseas—and are carried out
primarily abroad—demand an aggressive response by U.S. law
enforcement.83

In the complex web of financial institutional structures and the
new wave of cross-border cooperation, United States law
enforcement and foreign authority counterparts have increasingly
investigated the same criminal acts simultaneously, leading to
joint enforcement actions and prosecutions.84 As of 2017, the
Criminal Division’s Fraud Division of the DOJ “[h]a[d] over 50
pending parallel investigations in over 40 different jurisdictions
and involving over 50 different foreign regulatory and law
enforcement authorities.”85 Cross-border parallel investigations
in the financial world alone are increasing “exponentially,”
requiring a hard look into the process of financial investigations
on an international scale.86
Essentially, if testimony is considered compelled under
the Fifth Amendment, domestic prosecutors may be unable to
“obtain[ ] admissible evidence sufficient to support charges.”87
This could result in, and may be another explanation for, the
DOJ “declin[ing] to bring charges in worthy cases that the
United States would otherwise pursue.”88 The Allen decision,

81 See Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc at 12,
United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-898), reh’g denied, No. 16-898
(Nov. 9, 2017), ECF No. 136.
82 Id. The DOJ has “already elected to forgo worthy cross-border investigations
that, absent the [Second Circuit’s] decision, it would have vigorously pursued.” Id. at 17;
see also infra Part III (discussing possible repercussions of the Allen decision).
83 Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, supra
note 81, at 12.
84 Id. at 13.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 14.
88 Id. In 2015, former United States Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates
delivered a memorandum, “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing,” which
set forth procedures in DOJ policy for corporate investigations. Steps two through five
are below:
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and future decisions if other circuits follow its lead, exposes the
apparent difficulties the United States will inevitably face in
multijurisdictional white-collar investigations. Since the FCA
has no restrictions on the derivative use of testimony it compels,
unless a parallel United States investigation is initiated in the
“very early stages” as the court plainly suggests, there is “no
opportunity to request that the FCA ‘wall off’ or refrain from
exposing [a witness’s] compelled testimony.”89 Similar to the
United Kingdom, thirty-five other jurisdictions90 have
comparable “disclosure obligations that would prohibit [their
law enforcement agencies] from ‘walling off’ compelled evidence
from witnesses,” which could ultimately make the DOJ’s efforts
to bring forth an indictment with untainted evidence “futile.”91
A.

Triviality of the Allen Court’s “Solutions”
1. It Is Nearly Impossible for DOJ’s Prosecutors to be
First in Line for Every International Financial
Investigation

As the DOJ noted in its en banc petition, the Second
Circuit’s certainty that the United States can avoid taint
through “intimate cooperation and coordination,” specifically
through the DOJ’s involvement in every investigation’s
2. Both criminal and civil corporate investigations should focus on individuals
from the inception of the investigation;
3. Criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate investigations should be in
routine communication with one another;
4. Absent extraordinary circumstances, no corporate resolution should provide
protection from criminal or civil liability for any individuals;
5. Corporate cases should not be resolved without a clear plan to resolve related
individual cases
Individual Accountability, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD SECTION (FRD),
https://www.justice.gov/dag/individual-accountability [https://perma.cc/VBK5-S6CF].
89 Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, supra
note 81, at 15.
90 The thirty-six jurisdictions that can use compelled testimony which the DOJ
regularly coordinate with in corporate fraud investigations include the following:
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, the European Union, France, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain,
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab
Emirates, and the United Kingdom.
Id. at 14.
91

Id. at 15.
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beginning stages, does not consider the “practical realities of
international [white-collar] investigations” and subsequent
prosecutions.92 The problem of exposure to tainted testimony
cannot be blamed on the “United States law enforcement [failure]
to coordinate with foreign authorities adequately to avoid taint,
for example by ‘canning’93 testimony ahead of time,” rather, it can
be argued that it is a consequence of the lack of international
agreements streamlining cooperation in parallel investigations.94
In Allen, the DOJ took precautions to avoid tainted
evidence as soon as coordination with the FCA began.95 However,
since Robson did not become a witness for the DOJ until after
the FCA’s compulsory interview and after he took the DOJ’s plea
deal, “there was no opportunity for [DOJ] prosecutors to ‘can’ his
testimony beforehand.”96 Having to forgo an indictment after an
investigation with one of DOJ’s “most cooperative allies” because of
lack of continuity in how compelled testimony is, or should be,
treated reveals the “grave risk of taint [occurring] in cases in far
less favorable circumstances.”97 While the Allen case may represent
facts and an outcome that is case-specific,98 it exemplifies the
overarching vulnerabilities and difficulties that the DOJ faces
when prosecuting a foreign white-collar defendant.99
In a recently decided case before the federal grand jury
in the S.D.N.Y., United States v. Connolly,100 U.S. District Judge
Colleen McMahon was left with no choice but to push a criminal
trial back a year to allow time for a Kastigar hearing to examine
if taint was present during the investigatory process and
subsequent proceedings.101 Judge McMahon decided that she

Id. (citing United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2017)).
“Canning” testimony refers to ensuring that the testimony is not influenced
by any outside source, notably a source that has been compelled to testify. This “canned”
testimony can be compared to subsequent testimony to prove that later testimony is or
is not tainted. See Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police Officers and
Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1330 n.76 (2001).
94 Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, supra
note 81, at 15.
95 See supra Section I.B.
96 Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, supra note
81, at 15 (emphasis in original).
97 Id. at 16.
98 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 89 (2d Cir. 2017).
99 See Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, supra
note 81, at 17.
100 United States v. Connolly, 1:16-cr-00370 (CM), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36759
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 31, 2016).
101 Jody Godoy, Ex-Deutsche Trader’s Libor Trial Delayed by Taint Inquiry
(Dec. 14, 2017, 5:36 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/994990?scroll=1
[https://perma.cc/485Q-JL3].
92
93
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was “not going to make the same mistake” as Judge Rakoff made
in Allen, which she described as “fatal.”102
In May of 2016, Matthew Connolly, a U.S. citizen, and
Gavin Campbell Black, a U.K. citizen, were indicted with
conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud for participating in
the manipulation of the LIBOR interest rate while working at
Deutsche Bank.103 Like the Allen case, however, the DOJ was not
the first agency to retrieve the necessary information to begin
the investigation itself,104 and, after months of investigation by
the FCA, the DOJ decided to join its efforts and ultimately
prosecute the individuals.105 Following the indictment, the
defendants’ attorneys filed motions for a joint Kastigar hearing
to determine if either defendant’s compelled testimony “infected”
the prosecution.106 The motions argued that key cooperators
were exposed to Black’s testimony, the DOJ received assistance
from not only the FCA but also the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office
and the Commodities Future Trading Commission that had
access to the testimony, and the filter team (similar to a taint
team) “compounded the possibility of taint by failing to redact
its brief properly.”107 During the Kastigar hearing, the court
invoked the heavy burden on the DOJ to prove taint-free
testimony as established in Allen.108 After months of combing
through evidence and analyzing the process the DOJ and FCA used
to conduct the investigation, the court found, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the DOJ had not violated the defendant’s Fifth
Amendment right and the indictment was upheld.109
Judge McMahon, however, fervently distinguished the
Deutsche case from the Rabobank case, calling it a “sharp[ ] ”
contrast in records.110 The witness in Connolly, the “Robson,”
102 Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion for a
Kastigar Hearing at 9–10, United States v. Connolly, 1:16-cr-00370-CM (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
25, 2017), ECF No. 142.
103 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Former Deutsche Bank Employees
Indicted on Fraud Charges in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor
(June 2, 2016) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-former-deutsche-bank-employeesindicted-fraud-charges-connection-long-running [https://perma.cc/9SUS-NRT]; see also
Godoy, supra note 101
104 See Godoy, supra note 101.
105 Id.; see also Decision and Order on Defendant’s Pretrial Motions, 1:16-cr00370-CM, (Oct. 19, 2017).
106 See Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion
for a Kastigar Hearing, supra note 102 at 2–4.
107 Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion for a
Kastigar Hearing, supra note 102, at 2–3.
108 See Order Denying the Pretrial Motion of Defendant Gavin Campbell Black
to Dismiss the Indictment for Alleged Violations of United States v. Kastigar, United
States v. Connolly, No. 1:16-cr-00370 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2018), ECF. No. 274.
109 Id. at 16–18.
110 Id. at 16–17.
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never actually read either defendant’s compelled testimony, but
instead was privy to the findings in the FCA’s Final Notice and
was the “sole source of six specific items of information that were
presented to the grand jury.”111 The court concluded, however,
that the witness had a “source independent of the FCA Notice”:
“his own personal knowledge” as a seasoned trader at Deutsche
Bank.112 Similarly, the FCA had another source other than the
defendant’s compelled testimony that could account for the six
items of information given to the grand jury.113 This personal
knowledge and the FCA’s other source that proved taint was not
present, it can be argued, saved the DOJ’s case. If either did not
exist, the indictments could have very well been overturned—
another Allen outcome.
2. Taint Teams Create More Challenges Than They
Solve
The Second Circuit also erroneously offered the continued
act of embedding prosecutors in foreign jurisdictions, similar to
instituting taint teams, as a solution.114 A taint team is defined as
“a team of officials other than the case team, who sift [through]
documents and information received from another jurisdiction
and only pass on to the case team those which they have the right
to see without compromising the integrity of the proceedings.”115
While this might be promising on its face, the task of sifting
through and evaluating every piece of foreign-obtained evidence
for a hint of taint is daunting.116
The taint team procedure has a few structural flaws.117
First, the taint team does not wall off the government from
accessing and reviewing attorney-client privileged documents.118
It simply “changes the identity of the government attorneys and
Id. at 17.
Id.
113 Id.
114 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 87–90 (2d Cir. 2017).
115 INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, CO-OPERATION BETWEEN COMPETITION
AGENCIES IN CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS 24 n.39 (2006), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
international/multilateral/2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VTE-PNWP].
116 Id. at 24.
117 Stephen Jonas & Robert Keefe, Government “Taint Teams” May Open a
Pandora’s Box: Protecting Your Electronic Records in the Event of an Investigation,
WILMERHALE (May 11, 2004), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publications
andnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=94347 [https://perma.cc/V7XP-BCWV]; see also Robert
J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, Government Searches: The Trouble With Taint Teams, 256
N.Y.L.J. , No. 108, Dec. 6, 2016, https://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/2016-1206-government-searches-the-trouble-with-taint-teams/_res/id=Attachments/index=/Albert
%20Anello%2012.6.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/96EW-2W9V].
118 Jonas & Keefe, supra note 117.
111
112
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agents who first review that information.”119 While what is
considered attorney-client privilege in the United States is
considered a “relatively straightforward” doctrine, “other
jurisdictions [abroad] may apply different rules, or may not
formally recognize privilege at all” (similar to the treatment of
use and derivative use immunity).120 These differences “pose
vexing questions” and would require a DOJ taint team or
embedded filter team to navigate through every case the parallel
agency confronts, leading to an impractical use of resources.121 A
second inherent flaw is that “the prosecutors . . . who serve on
taint teams cannot be expected to ignore evidence of other crimes
they may potentially find” while reviewing, even if the
government was not focusing initially on that issue.122 Thus, the
trial team would have an “opportunity to assert privilege only
over [evidence] which the taint team has identified as being
clearly or possibly privileged [and taint-free],” which could lead
to relevant information being overlooked because of either the
sheer volume of evidence or unrelated matters.123
Early access to an investigation and embedded taint teams,
as suggested by the Second Circuit, have proven to be problematic
solutions and are inherently flawed.124 Determining which
testimony violates the Fifth Amendment is complex on many
levels, especially when multinational companies are involved.125 To
make this determination once an investigation is already
underway requires analyzing every aspect of the testimonygathering process conducted abroad and domestically.126 This
requires excess litigation and document review that expends

119 Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 840–41 & n.14
(D.D.C. 1997).
120 Patrick F. Linehan & Galen Kast, Navigating Privilege Issues Across
Multijurisdictional Investigations FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, (Apr. 2017) https://
www.financierworldwide.com/navigating-privilege-issues-across-multijurisdictionalinvestigations/#.W-MzaaeZNN0 [https://perma.cc/98PK-MR69].
121 Id.
122 Jonas & Keefe, supra note 117.
123 Anello & Albert, supra note 117; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (04124-03 and 04-124-05), 454 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]aint teams present inevitable,
and reasonably foreseeable, risks to privilege, for they have been implicated in the past
in leaks of confidential information to prosecutors. That is to say, the government taint
team may have an interest in preserving privilege, but it also possesses a conflicting
interest in pursuing the investigation, and, human nature being what it is, occasionally
some taint-team attorneys will make mistakes or violate their ethical obligations. It is
thus logical to suppose that taint teams pose a serious risk to holders of privilege, and
this supposition is substantiated by past experience.”).
124 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 87-90 (2d Cir. 2017).
125 See supra Part I (analyzing direct use and derivative use immunity and its
implications on foreign-born evidence).
126 See supra Section I.A (articulating the Kastigar standard).
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valuable resources.127 The court in Allen urged the DOJ to take
more initiative to combat this by entering the investigation stage
earlier.128 Without a standard of what constitutes “earlier,” the
Second Circuit has created a gray area for the DOJ to interpret
going forward.129 A solution in the forefront is therefore necessary
to avoid the constitutional question of tainted testimony and its
Fifth Amendment implications altogether in LIBOR-specific and
other international white-collar crimes. Not only does the Allen
decision affect market manipulation cases, it also has
ramifications for statutes that have been crucial in other
international investigations.130
B.

Beyond LIBOR-Specific Cases—Possible Impact of the
Allen Decision on Future Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Cases

In an effort to curb general fraudulent corporation
actions, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was enacted
in 1977 to “prohibit[ ] . . . bribes to foreign officials to assist in
obtaining . . . business.”131 The DOJ has applied the FCPA to
prohibited conduct across the world in which publicly traded
companies (in other words, global financial companies) and their
officers, directors, and employees are held accountable.132 In
2016, the United States saw exponential “increases in
international cooperation in anti-corruption enforcement” of the
FCPA.133 The DOJ saw “success[ ] in the fight against global
corruption by coordinating with and leveraging the resources of
their foreign counterparts,”134 through a “landmark global
resolution[ ] ” reached with Odebrecht S.A., the largest Brazilian
construction company in Latin America, “and the continuing
investigation and prosecution of individuals involved in the
Id. (discussing the Kastigar hearing).
Allen, 864 F.3d at 87.
129 See Hartley M.K. West et al., Cross-Border Criminal Investigations Just
Became More Complicated, RECORDER (Sept. 7, 2017).
130 John Cornell Fuller, Second Circuit Limits FCPA Enforcement Tools, FOX
ROTHSCHILD LLP (Aug. 25, 2017), https://internationaltrade.foxrothschild.com/2017/
08/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act-fcpa/second-circuit-limits-fcpa-enforcement-tools/
[https://perma.cc/C4U4-NYGZ].
131 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/foreign-corrupt-practices-act.shtml [https://perma.cc/3XF6-899L].
132 Id.
133 Client Memorandum, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, FCPA
Enforcement and Anti-Corruption Developments: 2016 Year in Review 13 (Jan. 20,
2017), https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/anti-corruption-fcpa/publications/
fcpa-enforcement-and-anti-corruption-developments-2016-year-in-review?id=23567
[https://perma.cc/86TE-LHE3].
134 Id.
127
128
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international soccer corruption scandal.”135 Both cases prove the
DOJ’s concern with working with parallel agencies and
encouraging “foreign governments [to] tak[e] more aggressive
stances through legislation and enforcement to attack the
problem of international corruption.”136
In 2016, Odebrecht pleaded guilty to FCPA charges and
agreed to pay billions to United States, Brazilian, and Swiss
authorities.137 The DOJ noted that the Odebrecht resolution is
notable because it “implicat[ed] officials at the highest levels of
government . . . and major Brazilian companies and their
executives” which can be contributed to the invaluable aid of
Brazilian authorities.138 DOJ officials, in response, issued public
statements highlighting that foreign coordination, “once a rare
event in FCPA investigations and resolutions,” is becoming
increasingly prominent and vital.139 Further, the DOJ stated
that “an international approach is being taken to combat an
international criminal problem . . . [and] we are sharing leads
with our international law enforcement counterparts, and they
are sharing them with us.”140
Since Brazil is one of the thirty-six141 countries that
legally allows compelled testimony and its derivative use, would
the Odebrecht case have had a different result if the DOJ was
not the agency to first initiate the investigation? If the DOJ had
joined the Brazilian agency later in the investigation, perhaps
the DOJ would have had to deny prosecution due to issues of
tainted testimony. And, if, because of taint, the DOJ could not
have been involved in the case, the question of whether Brazil

135

Id. at 13, 15. On the International Soccer Corruption Scandal:

Since May 2015, U.S. authorities have charged over [forty-two] individuals and
entities with racketeering, wire fraud, money laundering and other offenses in
connection with a decades-long scheme to enrich themselves by awarding
lucrative marketing contracts in exchange for bribes. To date, [twenty-two]
defendants have pleaded guilty. In 2016, seven individuals pleaded guilty to
criminal charges in the case, including the former president of Honduras and
former officials of regional and national soccer federations.
Id. at 17–18.
136 Id. at 13.
137 Id. at 15.
138 Id. at 15–16.
139 Id. at 13.
140 United States Department of Justice Memorandum on The Fraud Section’s
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/file/838386/download [https://perma.cc/
VT49-TWP4].
141 See supra note 90.
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would have had the resources to prosecute these white-collar
crimes without United States’ aid is compelling.142
III.

SOLUTION: CHILLING EFFECT OF SECOND CIRCUIT’S
DECISION CAN BE PREVENTED BY IMPLEMENTING
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES SPECIFICALLY
GEARED TOWARD CROSS-BORDER WHITE-COLLAR
INVESTIGATIONS

The
“international
approach . . . to
combat
an
international criminal problem” is the key language in which
prosecuting international white-collar crimes must be handled.143
The overwhelming burden on the DOJ to prove taint-free evidence
to avoid constitutional questions and Kastigar hearings is nearly
impossible in the new age of a global economy. The law itself must
evolve with the times, and international cooperation is at the
forefront of the twenty-first century. Multinational companies
and their employees drive the global economy, and investigations
to prosecute white-collar crimes are vital to maintain and protect
a healthy financial system. It is essential that the United States
is part of this movement and a specific international agreement
can provide a platform which will allow prosecutions by the DOJ
to be carried out effectively.
A.

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT)

In the realm of international law, Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties (MLATs) allow law enforcement officials, including the
DOJ, to make international requests for assistance by foreign
parallel counterparts relating to evidence gathering activities.144
Since they are legally binding negotiated agreements,145 United
States district courts are instructed to review incoming requests
and may deny them if they do not comport with domestic law,
142 If the DOJ cannot avoid taint by being first in line for every financial
investigation, white-collar crimes committed by individuals may unfortunately avoid
prosecution, “unless pursued by foreign law enforcement authorities.” Unfortunately,
“foreign authorities may not have the ability or resources—or the desire—to pursue
enforcement proceedings that vindicate the interests of the United States.” See Petition
of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, supra note 81, at 16–17.
143 United States Department of Justice Memorandum on The Fraud Section’s
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/file/838386/download [https://perma.cc/
VT49-TWP4].
144 T. Markus Funk, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Letters Rogatory: A
Guide
for
Judges,
FED. JUD. CTR. INT’L LITIG. GUIDE 6
(2014),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/MLAT-LR-Guide-Funk-FJC-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KZK2-5D2T].
145 Id. at 5.
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including the protections granted under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments of the Constitution.146
In the United States, an MLAT is negotiated by the DOJ
with approval of the U.S. State Department.147 The Secretary of
State then “formally submits the proposed MLAT . . . to the
President of the United States for transmittal to the U.S.
Senate.”148 After Senate approval, “the President signs the treaty”
to be enforced.149 When participating countries have complied
with entry-into-force provisions, the “MLAT becomes binding
under international law.”150
When a foreign country’s agency, for example the FCA,
requests United States’ assistance pursuant to an MLAT, the
United States court must determine whether “(1) the terms of
the MLAT prescribe practices or procedures for the taking of
testimony and production of evidence, (2) the Federal Rules of
Procedure and Evidence apply, or (3) the MLAT requires some
sort of a hybrid approach.”151 MLATs allow the United States to
follow the outlined procedures of the requesting country, including
the rules related to privilege and testimony gathering.152
B.

MLAT with the U.K.

The United States already has a general MLAT in place
with the United Kingdom (as well as bilateral MLATs with every
member of the European Union and many other countries worldwide)153 regarding taking testimony and producing evidence in
the jurisdiction of the requested party.154 In the relevant portion
of the “Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters” it states:
1. A person in the territory of the Requested Party from whom
evidence is requested pursuant to this Treaty may be compelled, if
necessary, to appear in order to testify or produce documents, records,
or articles of evidence by subpoena or such other method as may be
permitted under the law of the Requested Party.

Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 6.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 6, 1994, T.I.A.S. No.
96-1202. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176269.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y5SD-DPJY].
146
147
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2. A person requested to testify or to produce documentary
information or articles in the territory of the Requested Party may be
compelled to do so in accordance with the requirements of the law of
the Requested Party. If such a person asserts a claim of immunity,
incapacity or privilege under the laws of the Requesting Party, the
evidence shall nonetheless be taken and the claim be made known to
the Requesting Party for resolution by the authorities of that Party.155

This MLAT agreement gives the United Kingdom (namely, the
FCA) the ability to use compelled testimony, in accordance with
their laws.156 This does not, however, guard the United States
from obtaining testimony that is in direct violation of the
Constitution, leaving a gaping hole in foreign testimonygathering procedure in accordance with U.S. law.157
C.

MLAT and Taint Team Hybrid

The United States along with its foreign counterparts
should ratify a new MLAT that instills the principles that a taint
team provides, as a way to close the gap and ensure that the DOJ
can fully invest its resources into prosecuting white-collar crimes.
Given the increase in financial fraud cases in the last decade, a new
MLAT to address current issues of cross-border investigations is
paramount. An amended MLAT, directed at all thirty-six
jurisdictions where use and derivative use of compelled testimony
is lawful, would circumvent the unfairness concerns of a taint
team, obviate the need to address Fifth Amendment concerns, and
also provide the United States with the necessary leverage to
combat these financial crimes.158
In the past, there have been case-specific bilateral
treaties between the United States and other governments on
high-level criminal fraud cases.159 Between 1976 and 1982, the
DOJ created executive agreements with “[twenty-eight]
countries for the purpose of facilitating the sharing and transfer
of investigative information and evidence between law
enforcement agencies of the respective countries in specific
investigations and prosecutions.”160 These, now considered
“Lockheed Agreements,” were agreed upon based on the
“seriousness and sensitivity of the investigations” and “the
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
157 See id.
158 See generally Jonas & Keefe, supra note 117.
159 MICHAEL ABBELL, OBTAINING EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3-4,
99 (2010). “The majority of these investigations [concerned] alleged bribes paid to highranking foreign officials by [large] U.S. aircraft manufacturers.” Id.
160 Id.
155
156
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affected governmental authorities agree[ment] that the
investigations had to proceed quickly.”161 “Given the exigencies
of the circumstances, [ ] the number of affected countries,” and
expected time it takes for a general MLAT to be ratified, the
United States and the twenty-eight affected countries
“negotiate[d] a series of similarly worded, case specific,
executive agreements.”162
One can argue that the 2008 financial crisis amounted to
a grave situation in which a Lockheed-like MLAT would have
been appropriate. Now, nearly ten years after the global
economy suffered a major hit, an expedited agreement between
affected countries is no longer necessary. Instead, the United
States and countries that currently use compelled testimony in
their criminal investigations in the aftermath of the crisis,
should negotiate an agreement specifically geared towards
evidence collection in white-collar financial crimes.
For example, the United States and the United Kingdom
should implement an MLAT for “Testimony Gathering in
Criminal Cases Involving Financial Corporations and
Individual White-Collar Crimes within the United States and
the United Kingdom.” The MLAT would address that before an
investigation begins in either country, the government
authorities (DOJ and the FCA) would establish which authority
would be prosecuting. If the DOJ takes the lead on a case, the
FCA cannot compel testimony related to that case. If the FCA is
the primary authority assigned, it must notify the DOJ when
compelled testimony will be taken or used, and both parties will
agree upon its necessity. The “necessity” standard would be
based on the likelihood in which the testimony will be used to
implicate other individuals within the corporation.
This new specific MLAT form would essentially avoid the
risk of taint from the beginning of the investigatory process
without sending prosecutors to work full-time with foreign
agencies163 on financial white-collar crime matters and
ultimately avoid litigating a Kastigar hearing. Further, the
burden of taint-free evidence would not fall entirely on the

Id. at 100.
Id. at 100–01 (“The first of these executive agreements, the [A]greement
with Japan on Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Administration of Justice in
Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Matter, was concluded and entered into force
within weeks of the initial public disclosure that payments may have been made by
Lockheed to high-ranking Japanese government officials to induce the government’s
purchase of Lockheed aircraft. Within the following nine months, the United States
concluded similar agreements with nine other countries.”).
163 See Latham & Watkins, supra note 75.
161
162
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DOJ,164 since the issue would be addressed upfront and both
agencies involved would be required to fully cooperate and
comply with the agreement.
CONCLUSION
As we enter a “new era of crime on a global scale,” law
enforcement agencies are navigating the complexities of the evergrowing “criminal enterprises and global corporate misconduct.”165
Arguably, the international nature of crime is driven by “global
expansion of the footprint and market participation of U.S. and
foreign companies, and the growing interdependency of [the U.S.]
economy and those of nations around the world.”166 As a result, the
DOJ has expanded its criminal investigations abroad while foreign
enforcement agencies have continued conducting their own
criminal cases. Often, however, the agencies are investigating the
same misconduct, which has fostered cooperation in these
investigations and subsequent prosecutorial proceedings. This
cross-border coordination has created a new and valuable
dimension in prosecuting white-collar crimes.
Despite the advances in pursuing crimes in a transnational
setting, cases like Allen have exposed fundamental differences
between the legal authority governing testimony gathering and the
evidence that is allowed in the American courtroom. These
differences, if not addressed, have grave consequences. Instead of
expending resources to determine whether tainted evidence exists
or reducing the cases that the DOJ hears altogether, an
international legal remedy to circumvent constitutional concerns is
necessary—an international solution to further the efforts of the
DOJ and its foreign counterparts.
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